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This paper seeks to critically assess the way the EU guarantees the protection of individuals 
who are discriminated on multiple grounds. As EU law does not recognise that multiple 
identities can intersect, it is argued that the current anti-discrimination legal framework is 
not adequate to deal with claims of multiple and intersectional discrimination. Recent 
legislative developments have, however, raised the issue of multiple discrimination and 
intersectional disadvantage but they remain guarded and often take a simplistic, rather 
than an intersectional approach. The EU anti-discrimination legal framework appears to be 
at a cross-road and choices made by the legislator to promote the concept of multiple 
discrimination over that of intersectional disadvantage will have profound consequences for 
the EU anti-discrimination legal framework as a whole and its future developments. 
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Human beings have several identity markers attributable to their individual 
status, which include ―an age, a gender, a sexual orientation and an 
ethnicity.‖1 Over time they might acquire, lose or change religion and/or they 
might develop a disability. Identities are not set in stone and are made up of 
multiple elements. Some identity markers are more permanent than others; 
age and some disabilities evolve with time, but most people will not change 
                                                 
1 S. Fredman, ‗Double Trouble: Multiple Discrimination and EU Law‘, European Anti-Discrimination 
Law Review, No. 2, 2005, pp.13-18. 
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their sex. Individuals can decide to highlight some of their identities but not 
all traits are up for discretion; one can choose their religion, but not their age. 
A person can also, to an extent, control the visibility of certain aspects of their 
identity; sexuality can be hidden, while this is not necessarily the case for 
gender.2 The very nature of identities is therefore both complex and also fluid. 
Accordingly, the protection of individuals‘ identities demands an equally 
elaborate and adaptable anti-discrimination legal framework because if one is 
―to assume that groups are rigidly delineated by race, gender, disability, sexual 
orientation or other status, [then one] is to render invisible those that are 
found in the intersection between those groups.‖3 
 
This paper seeks to critically assess the way the EU guarantees the protection 
of individuals who are discriminated on multiple grounds. Prima facie, the 
EU has set a high standard. The values of the EU, enshrined in the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU), underline the importance of accommodating, 
protecting and fostering citizen‘s diversity in order to achieve both market 
unity and high standards of living. In Article 2, the TEU recalls that the Union 
is founded on ―the values of respect for [...] equality [...] and [...] human 
rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values 
are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-
discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and 
men prevail.‖ The main tasks and activities of the EU are outlined under 
Article 3 TEU and include in paragraph 3 the combat of social exclusion and 
discrimination, as well as the promotion of ―social justice and protection, 
equality between women and men, solidarity between generations and 
protection of the rights of the child.‖ In addition, Article 6(1) TEU establishes 
that the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the EU (the Charter),4 which reinforces the EU values with regard to 
equality and anti-discrimination, shall have the same legal value as the 
Treaties. Finally the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
set down provisions regarding gender equality (Article 157 TFEU) and 
provides competence for the EU ―to take appropriate action to combat 
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, 
disability, age and sexual orientation‖ (Article 19 TFEU). These principles and 
values are further implemented and supported by an array of secondary 
legislation and non-legally binding (soft) provisions.  
 
However, despite laying down strong commitments to equality and non-
discrimination, EU law almost exclusively addresses single axes of 
discrimination and the legislative instruments comprise exhaustive lists of 
prohibited grounds of discrimination. In other words, the legal framework 
does not appropriately address the situation of citizens who are discriminated 
against on a number of prohibited axes within that legal framework. For 
example, under EU law, a coloured skin lesbian who found herself being 
                                                 
2 J. Kantola and K. Nousianen, ‗Institutionalizing Intersectionality in Europe: Introducing the Theme‘, 
International Feminist Journal of Politics, Vol.11, No. 4, 2009, p. 468. 
3 S. Fredman, ‗Positive Rights and Positive Duties; Addressing Intersectionality‘, in D. Schiek, and V. 
Chege (eds.), European Union Non Discrimination Law: Comparative Perspectives on 
Multidimensional Equality Law, Abingdon, Routledge-Cavendish, 2008, p. 73. 
4 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted at 
Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007. 
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discriminated on the grounds of her identity (a combination of her ethnicity, 
her sexual orientation and her gender) would not be afforded legal protection 
on the multiple grounds, nor would it be recognised that her multiple 
identities could intersect. Instead, a legal claim for discrimination would need 
to be argued on every single ground (ethnicity, sexual orientation and gender). 
As various grounds are subject to different legal regimes, the claim would be 
very cumbersome, not to mention expensive. Consequently, the claimant 
would need to decide with the greatest care which ground would have more 
chance of success before the court. Thus, the legal framework falls short of 
protecting people‘s actual identity. Moreover, the framework fails to provide a 
basis to challenge, and more importantly, to modify or remove harmful 
stereotypes,5 ultimately entrenching the compartmentalisation and 
fragmentation of people‘s identities.  
 
Although, the EU legal framework remains inadequate in addressing claims of 
multiple discrimination, it appears nevertheless to be sympathetic to the 
argument for the protection against multiple discrimination and 
intersectional disadvantages, mainly under the influence of dynamic academic 
research.6 Whilst the EU legislator is beginning to realise the importance of 
multiple discrimination,7 it has not gone far enough and has arguably chosen 
an overly simplified approach. The proposal for a Council Directive on 
implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of 
religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation,8 adopted by the 
European Commission in early 2008 (and still under discussion to date) 
illustrates the struggles relating to the progressive inclusion of multiple 
discrimination provisions into the EU legal framework particularly well. This 
paper contends that despite some breakthroughs, the recent legislative 
initiative remains unable to genuinely improve the anti-discrimination law.  
 
In order to explore these assumptions, this article is organised in three main 
parts. The first part of the article analyses the theoretical framework 
underlying anti-discrimination law in the EU and its relationship to the 
concepts of multiple discrimination and intersectional disadvantage. The 
second part of the paper examines the current proposed directive 
implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of 
religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation with a view to critically 
assess it. In part three, the EU anti-discrimination legal framework is scanned 
                                                 
5 B. Smith, ‗Not the Baby and the Bathwater: Regulatory Reform for Equality Laws to Address Work-
Family Conflict‘, Sydney Law Review, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2006, p. 701. 
6 See for instance, D. Schiek and V. Chege (eds.), European Union Non-Discrimination Law: 
Comparative Perspectives on Multidimensional Equality Law, Abingdon, Routledge-Cavendish, 2008; 
D. Schiek and A. Lawson (eds.), European Union Non-Discrimination Law and Intersectionality, 
Farnham: Ashgate, 2011; E. Grabham, D. Cooper, J. Krishnadas and D. Herman (eds.), Intersectionality 
and Beyond: Law, Power and the Politics of Location, London, Routledge-Cavendish, 2008; L. McCall, 
‗Managing the Complexity of Intersectionality‘, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, Vol. 
30, No. 3, 2005, pp. 771-800; A. Phoenix and P. Pattynama (eds.), European Journal of Women's 
Studies, Special Issue on Intersectionality, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2006. 
7 European Commission, Tackling Multiple Discrimination: Policies, Practices and Laws, Brussels: 
European Commission, 2007(a); European Commission, Conference Proceedings: Equal Opportunities 
for All – Multiple Discrimination Matters, 6-7 December 2007, Elsinor, Denmark, Brussels: European 
Commission, 2007(b). 
8 COM (2008) 426 final, 07/02/2008. 
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for the problems it presents for people experiencing multiple discrimination 




Despite a high level of complexity, the EU anti-discrimination and equality 
legal framework only allows for the redress of an exhaustive number of 
grounds of discrimination and excludes any form of multiple discrimination 
claims. The EU framework was built up on the basis of the concept of formal 
equality. It originates in the Aristotelian doctrine of equality, which states that 
―things that are alike must be treated alike, while things that are unlike should 
be treated in proportion to their unalikeness.‖9 Although, the concept of 
equality in EU law has evolved considerably to involve substantial equality,10 
the need to find a comparator remains central in many cases to the 
establishment of discrimination.11 The problem is that it is nearly impossible, 
but also impracticable to systematically find a comparator that does share 
prohibited characteristics with the complainant, especially in cases of multiple 
discrimination and intersectional disadvantage.12 Thus, this construction of 
equality is flawed as it neglects the diversity that shapes human existence.  
 
So what exactly are multiple discrimination and intersectional disadvantages, 
and how do they provide a better form of protection for some individuals? In 
the EU law context, multiple discrimination covers ―all instances of 
discrimination on several grounds contained in [Article 19 TFEU] and in other 
instruments.‖13 Despite the absence of an EU legal definition,14 it is accepted 
that multiple discrimination depicts discrimination against an individual on 
more than one ground. Multiple discrimination can further be subdivided into 
two strands; namely, additive and compound discrimination.15 The former 
concept describes a situation where a person‘s identity markers are rooted in 
two or more different groups and the individual suffers from discrimination as 
a result.16 For example, a coloured skin lesbian might experience 
discrimination on the basis of her gender in one situation, on the ground of 
her sexuality in another and because of her ethnicity in yet another.17 The 
latter concept of compound discrimination inflates the discrimination 
                                                 
9 Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea V. 3 1131a – 1131b (W. Ross trans., 1925).  
10 See for instance Case C-243/95 Hill and Stapleton [1998] ECR I-3739. 
11 Direct discrimination occurs when ―one person is treated less favourably than another is, has been or 
would be treated in a comparable situation‖(Article 2(a) of Council Directive 2000/43/EC); indirect 
discrimination occurs ―where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons 
having [a racial or ethnic origin,] a particular religion or belief, a particular disability, a particular age, or 
a particular sexual orientation at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons‖(Article 2(b) of 
Council Directive 2000/43/EC). 
12 G. Moon, ‗Multiple Discrimination – Problems Compounded or Solutions Found‘, Justice Journal, 
Vol. 3, 2006, pp. 86-102; Kantola and Nousianen, op. cit, p. 466. 
13 S. Burri and D. Schiek (eds.), Multiple Discrimination in EU Law: Opportunities for Legal Responses 
to Intersectional Gender Discrimination?, Brussels, European Commission, 2009,  p. 4. 
14 I. Carles and O. Jubany-Baucells (eds.), The Use of Racial Antidiscrimination Laws: Gender and 
Citizenship in a Multicultural Context, Genderace Report, June 2010, p. 194. 
15 These two types of multiple discrimination are well established within the literature; see for instance 
Schiek and Chege, 2008, op. cit.  
16 S.  Hannett, ‗Equality at the Intersections: The Legislative and Judicial Failure to Tackle Multiple 
Discrimination‘, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1, 2003, p. 68; E.W. Shoben, ‗Compound 
Discrimination: The Interaction of Race and Sex in Employment Discrimination‘, New York University 
Law Review, Vol. 55, 1980, p.794. 
17 European Commission, 2007(a), op. cit, at p. 16. 
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experience. When discrimination occurs on two or more grounds each ground 
moulds to the next, creating a compounded effect of discrimination. 
Consequently, it becomes difficult to segregate the components of the 
discrimination. An example of compounded discrimination can be found in 
the UK case of Perera v Civil Service Commission (No. 2).18 In this case, an 
employer had set various requirements for applicants for a job with respect to 
age, experience in the UK, command of the English language and nationality. 
Mr Perera was not hired because he lacked a combination of the required 
factors. As a result, he was subjected to a compounded discrimination 
experience. Therefore, compounded discrimination is a situation where 
different discriminations merge together although they can still be separated 
in different grounds. 
 
The concept of intersectional discrimination in which the discrimination 
experience cannot be disentangled into a single strand of discrimination is 
similar (because the discrimination is based on more than one ground) but 
also strikingly different. ,. In instances of intersectional disadvantages, the 
discriminatory grounds are ―routed through one another and… cannot be 
untangled to reveal a single cause.‖19 Intersectional discriminatory grounds 
interact to form a unique discrimination experience. This is not unique in the 
sense that it is  isolated and rare for this form of discrimination to occur, but 
rather, an individual suffers discrimination on the basis of her/his own unique 
identity markers, creating a unique experience. In other words, intersectional 
discrimination is discrimination based on a specific combination of different 
aspects, for instance a person is discriminated as a black woman and this is 
linked to stereotyping. 
 
The pioneer behind the identification of this unique form of discrimination is 
Kimberlé Crenshaw, who coined the term during her plight for recognition of 
African American woman‘s rights in the 1980‘s. She used the analogy of 
intersecting streets to describe the effect of the discrimination black women 
were suffering:20 
 
―Discrimination, like traffic through an intersection, may flow into one 
direction and it may flow into another. If an accident happens at an 
intersection, it can be caused by cars travelling from any number of directions, 
and sometimes, from all of them. Similarly, if a black woman is harmed 
because she is in the intersection, her injury could result from sex 
discrimination or race discrimination.‖ 
 
While traditionally used to describe discrimination on the basis of race and 
gender, the intersectional methodology can be used to examine any number or 
                                                 
18 Perera v Civil Service Commission (No. 2) [1983] IRLR 166. 
19 E. Grabham, ‗Introduction‘ in E. Grabham, D. Cooper, J. Krishnadas and D. Herman (eds.), 
Intersectionality and Beyond: Law, Power and the Politics of Location, London, Routledge-Cavendish, 
2008, at p. 1. 
20 K. Crenshaw, ‗Demarginalising the Intersection of Race and Sex: a Black Feminist Critique of 
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics‘, University of Chicago Legal 
Forum, 1989, p. 145. 
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combination of discriminatory grounds.21 The UK case of Bahl v the Law 
Society22 illustrates intersectional disadvantage in the workplace. Ms Bahl, an 
Asian woman, was the subject of alleged discriminatory treatment on the basis 
of her race and gender. Neither of which could be isolated as the sole cause of 
her discriminatory experience; it was the very fact that she was both Asian and 
a woman that led to the disadvantage. In order to show the effect of the 
discrimination, the Employment Tribunal allowed Ms Bahl to use a white man 
as a comparator. Unsurprisingly however, on Appeal, the Tribunal‘s approach 
was found to be incorrect. The grounds of gender and race had to be 
untangled and examined separately. 
 
There is no doubt that courts have struggled to appropriately address 
discrimination on the basis of more than one ground because intersectionality 
is not a straight forward concept. 23 While its origins are found in legal 
discourse, intersectionality has expanded into interdisciplinary fields, such as 
gender studies, sociology, political science, economics and cultural studies.24 
The diversity and complexity of intersectionality mirrors that of the human 
beings‘ identity. Thus, the adoption of an interdisciplinary approach is an 
excellent tool to identify those unidentified victims of multiple discrimination 
and to understand their experience. Intersectionality ―requires us to look 
beneath the surface and beyond the prevailing norm paradigm that leaves 
various synergetic vulnerabilities unnoticed in the margins.‖25 
 
The Recent EU Legislative Initiatives 
 
In contrast to other jurisdictions such as the United States, the EU started 
from the outset to build anti-discrimination law on the ground of sex in the 
Treaty of Rome.26 This was followed by the introduction in the Amsterdam 
Treaty of a provision giving the EU competence ―to take appropriate action to 
combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, 
disability, age and sexual orientation.‖27 On the basis of this provision, two 
new anti-discrimination directives were adopted in the early 2000s, with the 
aim of securing effective legal mechanisms against discrimination on these 
specific grounds.  
 
Interestingly, both Directives acknowledge multiple discrimination. Directive 
2000/43/EC (hereafter the Race Directive)28 prohibits racial discrimination 
                                                 
21 R. Neilsen, ‗Is EU Equality Law Capable of Addressing Discrimination Yet?‘, in D. Schiek and V. Chege 
(eds.), European Union Non-Discrimination Law: Comparative Perspectives on Multidimensional 
Equality Law, Abingdon, Routledge-Cavendish, 2008, p. 33. 
22 Bahl v the Law Society [2004] IRLR 799. 
23 J. Squires, ‗Intersecting Inequalities: Reflecting on the Subjects and Objects of Equality‘, The Political 
Quarterly, Vol. 79, 2008, p. 55. 
24 Burri and Schiek, op. cit. p. 4. 
25 O. Arnardóttir, ‗Multidimensional Equality from Within: Themes from the European Convention on 
Human Rights‘, in D. Schiek and V. Chege (eds.), European Union Non-Discrimination Law: 
Comparative Perspectives on Multidimensional Equality Law, Abingdon, Routledge-Cavendish, 2008, 
p. 55. 
26 Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome became Article 141 EC with the entry into force of the Amsterdam 
Treaty, and is now Article 157 TFEU following the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
27 Article 13 EC has been replaced by Article 19 TFEU following the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. 
28 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, OJ 2000 L180/22. 
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in and outside the workplace as an explicit tool for fighting racism and 
xenophobia.29 Recital 14 in the preamble of the Race Directive recalls that 
promoting equality between men and women is important ―especially since 
women are often the victims of multiple discrimination.‖ Directive 
2000/78/EC (hereafter the Employment Equality Directive)30 provides a 
general framework for equal treatment in employment, occupation and 
vocational training on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or 
sexual orientation in the workplace. As in the Race Directive, and under 
similar terms, the Employment Equality Directive expressly recognises 
multiple discrimination at recital 3 of its preamble. Unfortunately, preambles 
of directives are not legally binding on the Member States and are therefore 
not required to be transposed into national law, nor can they be given direct 
effect. Thus, the acknowledgments in the preamble of both Directives have 
very limited effect for the legal recognition of multiple discrimination. 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon has further broadened the scope of EU equality and non-
discrimination law by providing constitutional foundations, which could 
sustain the launch of the concepts of multiple discrimination and 
intersectionality in the EU legal order. Under Article 10 TFEU the EU has a 
duty to mainstream equality and non-discrimination in all of its policies and 
activities. This means that, in addition to gender mainstreaming required by 
Article 8 TFEU, ―in defining and implementing its policies, the Union shall 
aim to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or 
belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.‖31 While this is a positive step 
forward, Article 10 TFEU appears to provide an exhaustive list of 
discrimination grounds, leaving no room for multiple or intersectional 
discrimination cases. However, the existence of a non-exhaustive list of 
prohibited grounds in the Charter (which status has been elevated to Treaty 
level) might help by-pass this problem.  Indeed, although it fails to specifically 
highlight multiple or intersectional discrimination, the Charter provides scope 
for these forms of discrimination to be interpreted by way of the non-
exhaustive list of prohibited grounds of discrimination. Article 21 specifies 
that ―any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic 
or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any 
other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, 
age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.‖ Use of the words ―such as‖ 
provide room for the inclusion of other forms of discrimination (including 
multiple or intersectional) as the list merely provides examples of forms of 
discrimination. 
 
The most significant development with regards to the emergence of the 
concepts of multiple discrimination and intersectional disadvantage, however, 
is not found in the EU constitutional evolution but in a proposed secondary 
legislation. Indeed, the European Commission adopted in 2008 a proposal for 
a Council Directive on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment 
between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age and sexual 
                                                 
29 C. Brown, ‗The Race Directive:  Towards Equality for All the People of Europe?‘, Yearbook of 
European Union Law, Vol. 21, 2002, pp. 196-204. 
30 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation, OJ 2000 L 303/16.  
31 Article 10 TFEU. 
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orientation (hereafter the proposed anti-discrimination directive outside 
employment or the proposed directive).32 The proposed directive aims to 
complement the rights contained in the Race and in Employment Equality 
Directives by prohibiting discrimination on the basis of four grounds of 
discrimination (religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation) 
outside the labour market. Hence, it proposes to address the shortcomings of 
the Employment Equality Directive and emulate the wider protection of the 
Race Directive. The proposed anti-discrimination directive outside 
employment aims to apply to the public and private sectors in social 
protection, social advantage, education, access to and supply of goods and 
services, including housing.  
 
Prima facie, the proposition put forward by the Commission stays firmly in 
line with both the Race and in the Employment Equality Directives and does 
not assist in reforming the existing EU anti-discrimination legal framework.33 
As in the Race and the Employment Equality Directives, the proposed 
directive acknowledges in its preamble the importance of multiple 
discrimination, but falls short of providing legal substance to this concept. In 
addition, it does not make any reference to intersectional disadvantages. This 
is particularly disappointing because at the time of the proposal‘s adoption, 
multiple discrimination and intersectionality had been on the ―reflection 
table‖ of the Commission.34  
 
The explanatory memorandum of the proposed directive suggested the 
Commission was ready to expand multiple discrimination and 
intersectionality into EU policy and beyond the scope of the directive. It even 
edged towards placing an onus on Member States to address multiple 
discrimination in their own national legislation.35 While it is unclear why the 
Commission never followed through, Bell suggests that it may have been to 
limit contentious issues that might arise during negotiations, thus slowing the 
adoption of the directive. The proposed directive was the perfect opportunity 
to push the boundaries of the existing legal framework, as ―a directive dealing 
simultaneously with four grounds of discrimination seems entirely apt for 
addressing the question of multiple discrimination.‖36 The failings of the 
proposed directive therefore represent a missed opportunity to address 
multiple and intersectional discrimination, the problems associated with 
finding an appropriate comparator and remedies for discrimination on 
multiple grounds.37 
 
                                                 
32 Op. cit. N. 8. At the time of writing, it is not clear when or whether the proposed anti-discrimination 
directive outside employment will be adopted, as the 27 EU Member States appear to be unable to reach 
unanimous agreement. 
33 M. Bell, ‗Advancing EU Anti-Discrimination Law: the European Commission‘s 2008 Proposal for a 
New Directive‘, The Equal Rights Review, Vol. 3, 2009, p. 8. 
34 See European Commission, 2007(a), op.cit. N. 7 and European Commission, 2007(b), op.cit. N. 7.  
35 Op. cit. N. 8, explanatory memorandum at p. 5 ―Attention was also drawn to the need to tackle 
multiple discrimination, for example by defining it as discrimination and by providing effective 
remedies. These issues go beyond the scope of this Directive but nothing prevents Member States taking 
action in these areas.‖ 
36 Bell, op. cit. p. 9. 
37 Ibid. 
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Nevertheless, on a more positive note, the European Parliament has suggested 
a number of liberal amendments to the proposed directive,38 which are no 
doubt influenced by academic thinking on multiple discrimination and 
intersectionality. The Parliament proposed the inclusion of the following 
definition of multiple discrimination in Article 1:39  
 
Multiple discrimination occurs when discrimination is based: 
(a) on any combination of the grounds of religion or belief, 
disability, age, or sexual orientation, or 
(b) on any one or more of the grounds set out in paragraph 1, and 
also on the ground of any one or more of 
(i) sex (in so far as the matter complained of is within the 
material scope of Directive 2004/113/EC as well as of this 
Directive), 
(ii) racial or ethnic origin (in so far as the matter complained of 
is within the material scope of Directive 2000/43/EC as well as 
of this Directive), or 
(iii) nationality (in so far as the matter complained of is within 
the scope of Article 12 of the EC Treaty). 
In this Directive, multiple discrimination and multiple grounds shall 
be construed accordingly. 
 
This is a positive step forward, because for the first time multiple 
discrimination has a chance to become legally binding under EU law. 
However, the definition recommended by the Parliament is not without its 
flaws, as it fails to recognise intersectionality and implies instead a notion of 
additive or compound discrimination. Further, the European Parliament‘s 
suggestion that the preamble of the proposed directive be amended to 
―include direct and indirect discrimination, multiple discrimination, 
harassment, instructions to discriminate and denial or reasonable 
accommodation‖40 neglects intersectional discrimination and may entice 
serious misinterpretations. Should a court be faced with intersectional 
discrimination, it may decide that this form of disadvantage not fall under the 
umbrella of multiple discrimination, because it is impossible to disentangle 
multiple discrimination into separate strands in cases of intersectional 
disadvantage.  
 
Furthermore, a potential backlash could be created by European Parliament‘s 
initiative. As the scope of the proposed directive only extends to four grounds 
of discrimination outside the field of employment, any express prohibition of 
multiple discrimination in the proposed directive could lead to the 
assumption that the lack of an express provision in any of the other anti-
discrimination directives is intentional.41 This would mean that directives 
which lack an express provision on multiple discrimination or 
                                                 
38 European Parliament legislative resolution of 2 April 2009 on the proposal for a Council directive on 
implementing the principle of equal treatment between person irrespective of religion or belief, 
disability, age or sexual orientation, COM(2008)0426 – C6-0291/2008– 2008/0140(CNS). 
39 Ibid., Amendment 37. 
40 Ibid., Amendment 16. 
41 D. Schiek and J. Mulder, ‗Intersectionality in EU Law: A Critical Re-Appraisal‖ in D. Schiek and A. 
Lawson (eds.), European Union Non-Discrimination Law and Intersectionality, Farnham, Ashgate, 
2011, pp. 259-273. 
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intersectionality could be interpreted as excluding these concepts a contrario. 
As courts have begun to recognise multiple discrimination in some Member 
States, further confusion and fragmentation might result from this 
interpretation. 
 
Moreover, this legal development poses a real risk for women because if the 
proposed directive is to be adopted (either as is, or with the European 
Parliaments suggested amendments) gender discrimination will become the 
least protected ground under EU law.42  This is particularly a problem as sex 
discrimination is still not prohibited in the areas such as education and the 
media in contrast to the Race Equality Directive, which has a much wider 
scope than the gender equality legislation. By failing to appropriately address 
multiple discrimination and intersectionality, the proposed directive 
reinforces the hierarchy of the EU anti-discrimination framework, where 
women are at the bottom. This means that subsets of women (for example, 
disabled women or coloured skin women) are not provided with adequate 
protection. While the current anti-discrimination framework has greatly 
advanced since the Treaty of Amsterdam, the structure of the directives 
arguably perpetuates injustice and causes conflict between the many groups 
advocating for different inequalities.43 The proposed directive prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation disability, age and religion or 
belief, is likely to further impact this hierarchy and keep equality rights for 
women at the bottom as it promises more protection for these grounds than 
that of gender.  
 
Critical Analysis of the Recent EU Legal Developments and 
Future Perspectives for Intersectional Disadvantage 
 
The EU anti-discrimination legal framework appears to be standing at a cross-
road. The choice made by the Commission and the European Parliament to 
promote, albeit with some restriction, the concept of multiple discrimination 
over that of the protection of intersectional disadvantage has profound 
consequences for the EU anti-discrimination legal framework as a whole. 
Should the proposed anti-discrimination directive outside employment be 
adopted, it would define the future direction for the protection of all 
individuals against discrimination in the EU. Indeed, the amendments put 
forward by the European Parliament to the proposed directive, although 
forward thinking because they introduce legally binding obligation towards 
multiple discrimination, remain largely inadequate to address the reality of 
many people‘s discrimination experience. Introducing a concept of multiple 
(compounded) discrimination to the proposed directive may be attractive 
because the concept is relatively simple and clear. Nevertheless many 
problems are linked to adopting such a rigid option.44 A legal framework, 
which includes multiple discrimination should be based on a single anti-
discrimination procedure in which all axes of discrimination are similarly 
                                                 
42 Bell, op. cit. p. 9. 
43 E. Lombardo and M. Verloo, ‗Institutionalising Intersectionality in the European Union: Policy 
Developments and Contestations‘, International Feminist Journal of Politics, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2009, p. 
482. 
44 Kantola and Nousianen, op. cit. N. 2, at p. 468. 
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weighted and addressed.45 However, the reality could not be further from this 
ideal. Indeed, members of various groups face widely different struggles as 
illustrated by the distinctive pleas between, on the one hand people 
discriminated on the grounds of sexual orientation who strive for recognition 
and equal access to the matrimonial rights and, on the other hand, individuals 
facing race or sex discrimination who are heavily interested in implementing 
equal pay and equal treatment in the workplace.46 Moreover, inequalities are 
multifaceted and often fluid, because individuals‘ identities are multiple and 
evolving. People can choose their religion; they might choose to display or 
keep hidden their beliefs, however, gender, age or race are for most people 
permanent and cannot usually be concealed.47 In contrast to a rigid system of 
multiple discrimination, a legal framework which allow for the redress of 
intersectional disadvantage ―disrupts established group demarcations used in 
anti-discrimination law.‖48 Therefore, if one is ―to assume that groups are 
rigidly delineated by race, gender, disability, sexual orientation or other 
status, [then one] is to render invisible those that are found in the intersection 
between those groups.‖49 
 
Additive or compounded multiple approaches further galvanise the 
compartmentalisation of individuals‘ identity. In doing so, a framework of 
multiple discrimination risks setting minority groups to work against one 
another, instead of fostering cooperation and synergy.50 This often results in 
hierarchy of inequality, the so-called ―oppression Olympics‖, which put the 
different groups in competition against one another in the hope of winning the 
main political support to create momentum on policy remedies for that 
particular group.51 
 
All the arguments point toward using an intersectional approach as a way to 
tackle the shortcomings of the concept of multiple discrimination. At least two 
large advantages can be identified from adopting an intersectional approach.52 
In the first instance, an intersectional analysis provides grounds to 
understand various discrimination experiences and in doing so, it allows 
discriminations which have remained hidden and unnoticed under previous 
anti-discrimination approaches to be disclosed and revealed. This challenges 
society‘s persistent and enduring inequitable structures. This process is very 
similar to that which was introduced following the adoption of the concept of 
indirect discrimination in EU law. Rules, requirements, organisation of 
general society, can at first glance appear to be fair, but the use of adequate 
legal tools (be it indirect discrimination or through the use of intersectional 
                                                 
45 Ibid., at p. 468. 
46 M. Verloo, ‗Multiple Inequalities, Intersectionality and the European Union‘, European Journal of 
Women’s Studies, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2006, p. 221. 
47 Kantola and Nousianen, op. cit., p. 468. 
48 Fredman, op. cit., p. 73. 
49 Ibid. 
50 A.-M. Hancock, ‗When Multiplication Doesn‘t Equal Quick Addition: Examining Intersectionality as a 
Research Paradigm‘, Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2007, p. 68. 
51 Ibid. See also S. Mazey, ‗Policy Entrepreneurship, Group Mobilisation and the Creation of a New 
Policy Domain: Women‘s Rights and the European Union‘, in J. Richardson (ed.), Constructing a 
Policy-Making State? Policy Dynamics in the European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012. 
52 T. Makkonen, ‗Multiple, Compound and Intersectional Discrimination: Bringing the Experiences of 
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discrimination) can help to reveal, combat and ultimately redress previously 
hidden structural discrimination. In practical terms, intersectional analysis 
would allow harmful stereotyping, which until now has remained hidden, to 
be revealed and tackled. Such prejudices include the promiscuity of Asian 
women;53 the high absenteeism amongst foreign female workers with 
dependent children;54 or the doubt that lesbians could not possibly also be 
good mothers.55  At the moment all of these examples and more can only be 
dealt with through the European Convention of Human Right or the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW), which are relatively weaker legal enforcement procedures 
compared to that of the EU via the direct effect principles and the ability for 
individual to claim EU rights directly into their domestic courts. In addition to 
this, enhancing the understanding of an intersectional analysis of 
discrimination will result in a more encompassing and effective policies to 
combat all forms of discrimination, including those that result from 
intersectional disadvantages. In other words, the use of an intersectional 
approach would allow the reform and re-shaping of existing anti-
discrimination legal frameworks which could be  applied to the largest section 
of population, in ways that multiple discrimination could not reach.   
 
Finally, a point must be made with regards to the EU‘s obligation to lead such 
a reform of the anti-discrimination legal framework. As explained in the 
introduction, the EU is based on the values of equality and anti-
discrimination, which form the fundamental principle of democracy. It is 
therefore a fundamental obligation for the EU to take the lead in 
implementing equality and anti- discrimination law which can be applied 
across the Member States. Despite some recognition of the potential of the 
concept of multiple discrimination and intersectional disadvantages,56 the 
EU‘s engagement with both concepts has been very limited. As ―intersectional 
policies have no institutional champions at the moment, and no machinery to 
drive the efforts of such development‖,57 the EU still falls shorts of redressing 
multiple and intersectional disadvantages. The inclusion of the European 
Parliament‘s amendments in the limited scope of the proposed directive 
would only partially obligate the EU any further. The lack of any legally 
binding instruments at EU level means that neither the multiple 
discrimination nor the intersectional approach to anti-discrimination have 
managed to filter through to legal practice. There is an overall absence of 
knowledge and awareness regarding these legal concepts both at the EU and 
national levels. In addition, there is a critical lack of statistical evidence,58 
which means that the current legal framework is likely to be unable to be 
amended in any substantial way.  
 
                                                 
53 S. K. Choo, ‗Converging Stereotypes in Racialized Sexual Harassment: Where the Model Minority 
Meets Suzie Wong‘, Journal of Gender Race and Justice, Issue 1, 1997 pp. 177-212.   
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55 E.B. v. France, Appl. No. 43546/02, Jan. 22, 2008, at para. 96-98 (European Court of Human 
Rights).   
56 For example, the European Commission‘s sponsored report on Tackling Discrimination; see 
European Commission, 2007a, op. cit.  
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Moreover, the Member States have generally resisted the introduction of 
multiple discrimination in their national anti-discrimination legal system,59 as 
previously illustrated in the UK case of Bahl v the Law Society.60 Evidence 
shows that in the rare occasions where Member States have addressed 
multiple and intersectional discrimination, the results have been biased,61 
disparate,62 not legally binding,63 incomplete and in need of further legal 
development64 or simply underfunded.65 The EU can learn from these 
national experiences by providing a complete definition of intersectional 
disadvantage and thereon clearly prohibit these kinds of discrimination, with 
adequate legal tools and properly funded awareness campaigns. Thus, EU 
leadership in this area is crucial. EU legally binding instruments must provide 
the adequate momentum for the Member States to act decisively and 
harmoniously on multiple discrimination and intersectional disadvantage. 
Reference to the concept of multiple discrimination in the preamble of EU 
directives is not enough as illustrated by the transposition of both the Race 
and the Employment Equality Directives, which has led to marginal 
implementation of the concept at national level. In 2007, a review of Member 
State legislation, carried out by the European Network of Legal Experts, has 
demonstrated that only five countries (Austria, Germany, Poland, Romania 
and Italy) out of the 27 EU Member States have addressed multiple 
discrimination in their national legislation.66 Without an EU Directive 
specifically designed to define the concepts in order to provide Member States 
with both methodological guidance and coherence, the incorporation of the 
concepts of multiple discrimination or intersectionality into national law will 
continue to pose problem. Without a comprehensible and harmonised legal 
obligation, Member States risk developing very different legal instruments 
incompatible with one another, resulting in variable national levels of 
protection.67 Some Member States might also decide to completely ignore 
these concepts. In the end, such a lack of harmonisation would further 
confuse citizens. Ultimately, rights that are unclear are useless for individuals‘ 




The above analysis has highlighted some of the flaws in the current EU anti-
discrimination framework and the proposed anti-discrimination directive 
outside employment. In some instances with regard to the European 
Parliaments‘ suggested amendments and their possible future judicial 
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interpretation the analysis is hypothetical. Nevertheless, these criticisms 
prove that drafting legislation that will adequately address multiple 
discrimination and intersectionality is not an easy task. The European 
Parliament is credited for its efforts in trying to bring multiple discrimination 
to the attention of the Commission and the public at large. However, the risks 
related to the proposed Parliament‘s amendments outlined above should not 
constitute an excuse for inaction and thus entrenchment into an even less 
adequate legal system. It is undeniable that, in its current form, the proposed 
directive merely fills a few gaps in the existing framework and is a missed 
opportunity to legislate a modern, unique and complex directive addressing 
multiple discrimination and intersectionality. It is particularly disappointing 
this did not happen given the false hope raised by the legal evolution and 
academic dynamism leading up to the adoption of the proposed directive. 
Instead, the result is an ―increasing disjunction between [...] the array of EU 
policy initiatives seeking to advance equality via positive action, 
mainstreaming and data collection, and [...] the actual content of EU 
legislation which remains wedded to traditional complaints based anti-
discrimination model.‖68 
 
                                                 
68 Fredman, op. cit., p. 16. 
